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Abstract
In this paper, we provide a notion of structure preserving maps (i.e. knowledge–belief morphisms) be-
tween knowledge–belief spaces. Then we show that—under the condition that the knowledge operators
of the players in a knowledge–belief space operate only on measurable subsets of the space—there is a
unique (up to isomorphism) universal knowledge–belief space to which every knowledge–belief space can
be mapped by a unique knowledge–belief morphism.
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1. Introduction
Type spaces in the sense of Harsanyi (1967, 1968a, 1968b) and knowledge spaces are the
most important tools to understand games of incomplete information. Player’s uncertainty in a
type space is represented by a σ-additive probability measure over the space. The knowledge
spaces, respectively Harsanyi type spaces, used in applications are usually ﬁnite. Regardless,
they typically do not contain enough states so as to represent all the potential states of mind
that the players could possibly have about the interaction at hand. This poses the question as to
whether the missing states prevent a correct analysis of the problem.
Mertens and Zamir (1985) showed that this problem does not arise for Harsanyi type spaces.
They showed that, under suitable topological assumptions on the type spaces there is a “largest”
Harsanyi type space which “contains” all possible states of the world. That is, they showed
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the existence of a universal Harsanyi type space to which every Harsanyi type space can be
mapped by a morphism. A morphism is a map that preserves the state of nature and the beliefs
of the players. Therefore, the analysis carried out in a ﬁnite or otherwise restrictive Harsanyi
type space could be transferred, intact, to the universal Harsanyi type space. The proof of the
existence of a universal Harsanyi type space was extended to more general topological cases
by Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), Heifetz (1993), Mertens et al. (1994), and ﬁnally to the
general measure theoretic case by Heifetz and Samet (1998b). Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999)
extended the framework of Brandenburger and Dekel to type spaces with beliefs conditioned on
observations about nature and proved the existence of a universal type space for this case. Meier
(2006) proved the existence of a universal Harsanyi type space if beliefs are described by ﬁnitely
additive probability measures.
Knowledge (see for example Aumann, 1976, 1999a or Heifetz, 1997) is usually described by
knowledge spaces. For each player, there is an information partition of the underlying space of
states of the world: For each state, the player knows an event if and only if the partition member
that contains that state is a subset of the event. Then, given an event (that is a subset of the
underlying space of states of the world) one can consider the set of states in which the player
knows the event. This set is itself an event and so one has derived, for each player, a knowledge
operator that maps events to events. Such a knowledge operator satisﬁes certain properties: For
example, a player knows what he knows, he knows what he does not know, and what he knows
obtains. Alternatively, one could start directly with one such operator for each player. This would
basicallybejustanotherwaytowritedownthestructure:Onecanshowthateachsuchknowledge
operator is derived from a partition, where the partition can be deﬁned in terms of the operator.
Heifetz and Samet (1998a) have shown that, unfortunately, unlike for Harsanyi type spaces,
there is no universal knowledge space. This result was extended by Meier (2005) to the more
general context of information structures (or “Kripke structures,” as they are called in Modal
Logic), that can be viewed as generalizationsof knowledgespaces that describe non-probabilistic
beliefs.
A result in a similar vein is the impossibility result of Brandenburger and Keisler (2006) in
the related context of possibility models. They associate each such structure with a ﬁrst-order
logic. The idea behind this approach is that the players would use this language to reason about
each other and nature. What is desired then, is that for each possible belief of player i (which is a
subset of the product of the space of states of nature and the space of types of the other player j
that is deﬁnable by a ﬁrst order formula) there is a type of player i who has exactly this belief.
Unfortunately, to ask for beliefs-completeness in this sense is too much. Such a structure cannot
exist (given at least 2 states of nature). The reason behind this is that ﬁrst order logic can express
self-referential statements which could be thought of as the formalization of a more complicated
version of the antinomy of the liar, but involving two players: “Ann believes that Bob assumes
that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong.” Whether Ann believes that Bob’s assumption
is wrong or right, both cases lead to a contradiction.
In this framework of possibility models, Mariotti et al. (2005) were able to construct a uni-
versal structure by imposing topological restrictions on the possibility correspondences of the
players. Their universal possibility model is also complete with respect to the beliefs deﬁned in
their setting, where a possible belief of a player is compact subset of the product of the space of
states of nature and the space of types of the other player(s). In the universal model, for every
such compact subset there exists a type of the player whose possibility set is exactly this compact
subset. Note that by the impossibility result of Brandenburger and Keisler not every subset which
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such sets are also ﬁrst-order deﬁnable, while the complement of a compact set might not be
compact.
We remark that possibility models do not have all the nice properties of knowledge. For ex-
ample, the truth axiom is violated. A possibility model is a product structure. That is, to every
type t1 of player 1 that occurs in some state of the world and every type t2 of player 2 that occurs
in some other state of the world there is a state of the world where player 1 is of type t1 and at
the same time the type of player 2 is t2. Such a property is of course incompatible with the truth
axiom: In a knowledge space, if type t1 of player 1 knows something that is incompatible with
type t2 of player 2, then there cannot exist a state of the world in which player 1 is of type t1 and
player 2 is of type t2.
If we do not assume that there is a common prior of which the beliefs of the players are
posteriors, the beliefs of the players in a Harsanyi type space are subjective, and apart from
some consistency conditions (so that the beliefs of a type of a player can be represented by
a σ-additive probability measure, and that the players “know” their own beliefs) there is no
restriction imposed upon the players’ beliefs. However, such a probabilistic assessment of events
is necessary if one wants to study the behavior of utility maximizing agents (players).
The subjectivity of probabilistic beliefs is in sharp contrast to the properties of knowledge,
where if a player knows an event in a state this event must obtain in that state. Hence, we believe
that it is desirable to bring these two approaches together within one structure where one could
exploit the strengths of both approaches.
Aumann (1999b) has constructed a canonical knowledge–belief space, that is, a knowledge–
belief space which contains all states that can be described as maximal satisﬁed sets of formulas
in the language of some modal logic. The only difference of his deﬁnition of a knowledge–
belief space to the deﬁnition here is that the knowledge part in Aumann (1999b) is described by
partitions of the state space, one for each player, and that the knowledge operators are derived
from those partitions.
Fagin and Halpern (1994) also have a semantics for knowledge and probabilistic belief that
is similar to Aumann’s and the one described here. The non-probabilistic part of their model
consists of a Kripke structure. The probabilistic part is modeled in the following way: For each
state and each player there is a probability space, whose underlying space is a subset of the
state space of the Kripke structure. In their models, it is not guaranteed that the set of states
where a player believes that some event E occurs with probability (at least) p is a measurable
event. They present some properties sufﬁcient to guarantee the measurability of such events. One
condition sufﬁcient to guarantee measurability is that, in each state all the players have the same
probabilistic beliefs. However, in Game Theory and Economics one clearly wants to allow that
in a state the beliefs of the players differ from each other.
Still, an appropriate deﬁnition of structure preserving maps, that is, morphisms, has to be
provided and some appropriate conditions have to be found such that there is some hope to
construct a universal knowledge–belief space under these conditions.
In this paper, we provide a notion of structure preserving maps (that is, knowledge–belief
morphisms) between knowledge–belief spaces.
Then we show that under the assumption that the knowledge operators of the players in a
knowledge–beliefspace operate only on measurable subsets of the space, we are able to construct
a universal knowledge–belief space to which every knowledge–belief space can be mapped by a
unique knowledge–belief morphism. This universal knowledge–belief space is unique up to iso-
morphism. The proof of the existence of the universal knowledge–beliefspace applies techniques
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Why should the knowledge operators of the players just operate on measurable sets and not on
all subsets of the space? The justiﬁcation for this is that we think of events as those sets of states
that the players can describe, and only those can be the objects of their reasoning. In view of
this interpretation a statement saying “player i knows that the actual state of the world is in E,”
where E is an entity of states he cannot represent in his mind, is meaningless. Of course, it might
well be that in some knowledge–belief spaces all subsets of the space of states of the world can
be described by the players (for example in the ﬁnite knowledge–belief spaces), but we do not
want to assume this in general.
Why do we not follow the standard procedure and start (like Aumann, 1999b) with partitions
for the players and derive the players’ knowledge operators from them? Here, we do not restrict
ourselves to ﬁnitely or countably many players and to a separable space of states of nature (or
countably many atomic formulas). We do not know of any natural, and not too restrictive condi-
tion on the partitions of the players that would guarantee that the derived knowledge operators
send measurable sets to measurable sets (except asking for this property directly, but then, why
bother to introduce partitions in the ﬁrst place?). Note that, for example, measurability of the
partition members is not enough: There might be uncountably may partition members Pi that are
contained in a certain event E and then the set KiE :=

{Pi | Pi ⊆ E} might not be measurable.
2. Preliminaries
Unless otherwise stated, θ denotes functions from the set of states of the world to the set of
states of nature, μ and ν denote measures, ϕ,χ,ψ expressions, and ω sets of expressions.
If not stated otherwise, we keep the following
Convention 1. If (M,Σ) is a measurable space, then Δ(M,Σ) denotes the space of probability
measures on (M,Σ). We consider this space as a measurable space endowed with the σ-ﬁeld
ΣΔ generated by all the sets {μ ∈ Δ(M,Σ) | μ(E) p}, where E ∈ Σ and p ∈[ 0,1].
Remark 1. Let (M ,Σ ) and (M,Σ) be measurable spaces and let f :M  → M be measurable.
(1) If μ  is a probability measure on (M ,Σ ), then μ (f −1(·)) (that is μ (f −1(E)), for E ∈ Σ)
is a probability measure on (M,Σ).
(2) If Δf :Δ(M ,Σ ) → Δ(M,Σ) is deﬁned by Δf(μ ) := μ (f −1(·)), for μ  ∈ Δ(M ,Σ ),
then Δf is measurable, since we have Δf(μ )(E)  p iff μ (f −1(E))  p, for E ∈ Σ.
Deﬁnition 1. Let (M,Σ) be a measurable space. A function K :Σ → Σ is called a knowledge
operator iff it satisﬁes the following properties:
(1) K(E)⊆ E,
(2) E ⊆ F implies K(E)⊆ K(F),
(3) ¬K(E)⊆ K(¬K(E)),
(4)

n∈NK(En) ⊆ K(

n∈NEn).
As is well known, positive introspection follows from the other properties of the knowledge
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Remark 2. Let K be a knowledge operator on the measurable space (M,Σ). Then we have
K(E)⊆ K

K(E)

, for all E ∈ Σ.
For the rest of this section, we ﬁx a non-empty set of players I, a non-empty set of states of
nature S, and, unless otherwise stated, a σ-ﬁeld ΣS on S, such that for all s,s  ∈ S with s  = s 
there is an E ∈ ΣS such that s ∈ E and s  / ∈ E.Note that, apart from being non-empty, we do not
impose any restriction on the cardinality of I and S.
We deﬁne now knowledge–belief spaces, i.e. the objects which we will study in this paper.
They are Harsanyi type spaces which are endowed with additional knowledge operators, one for
each player:
Deﬁnition 2. A knowledge–belief space on S for player set I is a 5-tuple
M :=

M,Σ,(Ki)i∈I,(Ti)i∈I,θ

,
where
(1) M is a non-empty set,
(2) Σ is a σ-ﬁeld on M,
(3) Ki is a knowledge operator on (M,Σ),f o ri ∈ I,
(4) for i ∈ I: Ti is a Σ −ΣΔ-measurable function from M to Δ(M,Σ), the space of probability
measures on (M,Σ),
(5) for m ∈ M and E ∈ Σ: m ∈ Ki(E) implies Ti(m)(E) = 1,
(6) for m ∈ M and E ∈ Σ: [Ti(m)]⊆E implies m ∈ Ki(E), where [Ti(m)]: ={ m  ∈ M |
Ti(m ) = Ti(m)},
(7) θ is a Σ −ΣS-measurable function from M to S.
The deﬁnition of the knowledge–belief spaces given here exhibits an asymmetry in that the
knowledge part is modeled with knowledge operators, while the belief part is described by type
functions and not by p-belief operators for p ∈[ 0,1].
We explainedalreadythereason forchoosingknowledgeoperatorsinsteadofinformationpar-
titions. We could certainly describe the beliefs part with p-belief operators. But to point out that
the knowledge–belief spaces are Harsanyi type spaces with some additional knowledge struc-
ture, the beliefs part is still represented by type functions. Nevertheless, in Deﬁnition 6, p-belief
operators will be deﬁned.
We deﬁne now the beliefs preserving maps between knowledge–belief spaces.
Deﬁnition 3. Let M  =  M ,Σ ,(K 
i)i∈I,(T 
i )i∈I,θ   and M =  M,Σ,(Ki)i∈I,(Ti)i∈I,θ  be
knowledge–belief spaces on S for player set I.
A function f :M  → M is a knowledge–belief morphism if it satisﬁes the following condi-
tions:
(1) f is Σ  −Σ-measurable,
(2) for all m  ∈ M 
θ (m ) = θ

f(m  )

,
(3) for all E ∈ Σ,and i ∈ I
K 
i

f −1(E)

= f −1
Ki(E)

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(4) for all m  ∈ M ,E∈ Σ,and i ∈ I
Ti

f(m  )

(E) = T  
i (m )

f −1(E)

.
Deﬁnition 4. A knowledge–belief morphism is a knowledge–belief isomorphism, if it is one-to-
one, onto, and the inverse function is also a knowledge–belief morphism.
An easy check shows:
Remark 3. Knowledge-belief spaces on S for player set I, as objects, and knowledge–belief
morphisms, as morphisms, form a category.
Deﬁnition 5. A knowledge–belief space Ω on S for player set I is universal1 if for every
knowledge–belief space M on S for player set I there is a unique knowledge–belief morphism
from M to Ω.
Remark4. Universalknowledge–beliefspaceson S for playerset I are uniqueup to knowledge–
belief isomorphism.
3. The universal knowledge–belief space in terms of expressions
Again, for this section, unless otherwise stated, we ﬁx a non-empty player set I, and a mea-
surable space of states of nature (S,ΣS) such that for all s,s  ∈ S with s  = s  there is an E ∈ ΣS
such that s ∈ E and s  / ∈ E.
Given these data, we deﬁne kb-expressions (allowing also for inﬁnite conjunctions) which are
natural generalizations of the expressions deﬁned by Heifetz and Samet (1998b). Expressions
are deﬁned in a similar fashion as, for example, the formulas of the probability logic of Heifetz
and Mongin (2001). Analogous to Heifetz and Samet (1998b), given a knowledge–belief space
on S for player set I and a state of the world in this knowledge–belief space, we deﬁne the
kb-description of this state as the set of those kb-expressions that are true in this state of the
world. Then, we show that the set of all kb-descriptions constitutes a knowledge–belief space
(Proposition 4) and that this knowledge–belief space is the universal knowledge–belief space
(Theorem 1).
We deﬁne now the already mentioned p-belief operators.
Deﬁnition 6. For a knowledge–belief space  M,Σ,(Ki)i∈I,(Ti)i∈I,θ  on S for player set I,
i ∈ I,E∈ Σ,and p ∈[ 0,1] deﬁne
B
p
i (E) :=

m ∈ M | Ti(m)(E)  p
	
.
Note that B
p
i (E) = T −1
i ({μ ∈ Δ(M,Σ) | μ(E) p}) and that B
p
i (E) ∈ Σ,if E ∈ Σ.
Now, a language is introduced, the formulas of which are called kb-expressions. These kb-
expressions are formulas of an inﬁnitary modal language, where the atomic formulas are mea-
surable sets of states of nature instead of primitive propositions.
1 We use here the term “universal knowledge–belief space” although, in terms of category theory the term “terminal
knowledge–belief space” would be the adequate one, since the universal knowledge–belief space is a terminal object
in the category of knowledge–belief spaces. However, we use the former terminology for consistency with the existing
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Deﬁnition 7. Given a measurable space of states of nature (S,ΣS) and a non-empty player set I,
the set Φ of kb-expressions is the least set such that:
(1) every E ∈ ΣS is an expression,
(2) if ϕ is an expression, then ¬ϕ is an expression,
(3) if ϕ is an expression, then ki(ϕ) is an expression, for i ∈ I,
(4) if ϕ is an expression, then b
p
i (ϕ) is an expression, for i ∈ I and p ∈[ 0,1],
(5) if Ψ is a non-empty set of expressions with |Ψ|  ℵ0, then


ϕ∈Ψ ϕ is an expression.
If Ψ is a non-empty set of expressions with |Ψ|  ℵ0, then we set

ϕ∈Ψ ϕ := ¬


ϕ∈Ψ ¬ϕ.
Deﬁnition 8. Let M :=  M,Σ,(Ki)i∈I,(Ti)i∈I,θ  be a knowledge–belief space on S for player
set I. Deﬁne
(1) EM := θ−1(E), for E ∈ ΣS,
(2) (¬ϕ)M := M \ϕM, for ϕ ∈ Φ,
(3) (ki(ϕ))M := Ki(ϕM), for ϕ ∈ Φ and i ∈ I,
(4) (b
p
i (ϕ))M := B
p
i (ϕM), for ϕ ∈ Φ, i ∈ I and p ∈[ 0,1],
(5) (


ϕ∈Ψ ϕ)M :=

ϕ∈Ψ ϕM, for an at most countable Ψ such that ∅  = Ψ ⊆ Φ.
So, deﬁned as above, kb-expressions deﬁne measurable subsets of M. It is easy to check that
(

ϕ∈Ψ ϕ)M =

ϕ∈Ψ ϕM, for Ψ such that ∅  = Ψ ⊆ Φ and |Ψ|  ℵ0.
If no confusion may arise, we sometimes omit—with some abuse of notation—the super-
script M.
Deﬁnition 9. For a knowledge–belief space M :=  M,Σ,(Ki)i∈I,(Ti)i∈I,θ  on S for player
set I and m ∈ M deﬁne D(m), the kb-description of m, as
D(m):=

ϕ ∈ Φ | m ∈ ϕM	
.
The following proposition shows that kb-morphisms preserve the description of a state.
Proposition 1. Let  M,Σ,(Ki)i∈I,(Ti)i∈I,θ  and  N,ΣN,(KN
i )i∈I,(TN
i )i∈I,θN  be knowl-
edge–belief spaces on S for player set I and let f :M → N be a kb-morphism. Then, for all
m ∈ M
D

f(m)

= D(m).
We start now with the construction of the universal knowledge–belief space.
The ﬁrst step is to deﬁne the set of states of the world and to endow this set with a σ-ﬁeld.
Deﬁnition 10. Deﬁne Ω to be the set of all kb-descriptions of states of the world in knowledge–
belief spaces on S for player set I.F o rϕ ∈ Φ deﬁne
[ϕ]: ={ ω ∈ Ω | ϕ ∈ ω}.
Obviously, we have Ω \[ϕ]=[ ¬ ϕ] and

ψ∈Ψ[ψ]=[


ψ∈Ψ ψ], where ϕ is a kb-expression
and Ψ is a non-empty set of kb-expressions with |Ψ|  ℵ0. It follows that:60 M. Meier / Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2008) 53–66
Remark 5. The set
ΣΩ :=

[ϕ]|ϕ ∈ Φ
	
is a σ-ﬁeld on Ω.
Lemma 1. For every knowledge–belief space M on S for player set I and for every ϕ ∈ Φ, the
kb-description map D:M → Ω satisﬁes
D−1
[ϕ]

= ϕM.
Note that Lemma 1 implies that D is measurable.
Now, for every i ∈ I, we deﬁne an operator K∗
i on (Ω,ΣΩ).
Deﬁnition 11. For ϕ ∈ Φ deﬁne
K∗
i

[ϕ]

:=

ki(ϕ)

.
Proposition 2. For every knowledge–belief space M :=  M,Σ,(Ki)i∈I,(Ti)i∈I,θ  on S for
player set I, for every ϕ ∈ Φ and every i ∈ I,the kb-description map D:M → Ω satisﬁes
Ki

D−1
[ϕ]

= D−1
K∗
i

[ϕ]

.
Next, we endow our space with type functions, one for each player.
Proposition 3. For every i ∈ I there exists a function
T ∗
i :Ω → Δ(Ω,ΣΩ)
such that for every knowledge–belief space M on S for player set I with kb-description map D
and every m ∈ M
T ∗
i

D(m)

(·) = Ti(m)

D−1(·)

.
We also need a function θ∗ which tells us which state of nature corresponds to a given state
of the world.
Lemma 2. There is a measurable function θ∗:Ω → S such that for every knowledge–belief
space M on S for player set I and every m ∈ M
θ∗
D(m)

= θ(m).
Note that there might be many states of the world to which a given state of nature corresponds
to.
Now, we check that the K∗
i are indeed knowledge operators.
Lemma 3. K∗
i is a knowledge operator on (Ω,ΣΩ), for every i ∈ I.
A ﬁrst success is that we have constructed a knowledge–belief space, which is our candidate
for being the universal knowledge–belief space.M. Meier / Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2008) 53–66 61
Proposition 4. The space

Ω,ΣΩ,

K∗
i

i∈I,

T ∗
i

i∈I,θ∗
is a knowledge–belief space on S for player set I.
The following lemma guarantees, together with Proposition 1, that the kb-morphism from a
knowledge–belief space to the universal knowledge–belief space is unique. Not surprisingly, this
morphism is the corresponding kb-description map.
Lemma 4. The kb-description map
D:Ω → Ω
is the identity.
Finally we obtain our desired main result.
Theorem 1. The space

Ω,ΣΩ,

K∗
i

i∈I,

T ∗
i

i∈I,θ∗
is a universal knowledge–belief space on S for player set I.
Proof. According to Lemma 1, for every knowledge–belief space M on S for player set I,t h e
kb-description map D:M → Ω is measurable, and according to Proposition 2, Proposition 3
and Lemma 2, D is a kb-morphism. It remains to show that it is the unique knowledge–belief
morphism from M to Ω. But this is clear by Proposition 1 and Lemma 4. 
4. Discussion
Comparing the existence result here with the non-existence results of Heifetz and Samet
(1998a), Meier (2005), or the impossibility result of Brandenburger and Keisler (2006), one
might ask, what is the difference, why does it work this time?
Asalreadymentioned,thereasonbehindtheimpossibilityresultofBrandenburgerandKeisler
is that the language they use is so powerful that, in some sense, it allows to talk about formulas
of the language itself. Clearly, the language used here to construct the universal knowledge–
belief space is much weaker. Hence such self-referential statements cannot be made with the
kb-expressions used in this paper.
The impossibility results of Heifetz and Samet (1998a) or Meier (2005) do not mention a
language explicitly. The assumption that the knowledge operators operate on all subsets of the
knowledge spaces leads to the following circularity: Informally, a universal space contains repre-
sentations of all possible proﬁles of knowledge/belief-types of the players, especially those that
could be deﬁned within that space. Hence a minimal requirement in order to have a chance to
construct a universal space is that one is able to ﬁnd a space that has at least as many states as
there are possible proﬁles of types of the players. However, if all subsets of the space are mea-
surable, there are always more possible beliefs than states, so one would have to pass to a larger
space, but in this larger space again more possible beliefs would be deﬁnable than the cardinality
of states this space would contain, and hence this enlargement procedure would never come to62 M. Meier / Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2008) 53–66
an end. The restriction of the knowledge operators to measurable events in this paper makes it
possible to solve this problem.
Heifetz and Samet (1998b, p. 339) mention that their existence proof does also apply when-
ever beliefs are described by monotonic and continuous set-functions and not only when beliefs
are sigma-additive probability measures. However, in the case of knowledge the carrier func-
tions that represent knowledge are not continuous with respect to increasing sequences of events
(a player may not know any event in an increasing sequence of events, but may nevertheless
know their union).
One important difference between their construction and ours is that they manage to restrict
themselves to expressions of ﬁnite length. This is so, because their Lemma 4.5 implies that the
beliefs of a player (in a state) about events in the σ-algebra generated by the expressions are
already determined by the beliefs about the expressions of ﬁnite length (note that in general the
events deﬁned by expressions of ﬁnite length form only an algebra but not a σ-algebra). As the
above mentioned discontinuity indicates, in the case of knowledge this would probably not work
(the “knowledge version” of Lemma 4.5 of Heifetz and Samet (1998b) does not exist), but it is
also not needed: Since we allow for expressions of countable length, if in some state a player
does not know any event in an increasing sequence of events each of which is deﬁned by an
expression, but does nevertheless know their union, our language is rich enough to express this
fact.
Our language is closed under negation, countable conjuction (and also countable disjunc-
tion) and each measurable event in the universal knowledge–belief space is deﬁned by some
expression. Hence the kb-description of a state in some knowledge–belief space contains all the
information about this state that needs to be taken into account in the construction of the univer-
sal knowledge–belief space. This in turn implies that if Heifetz and Samet (1998b) would have
chosen to allow also for expressions of countable length, there would have been no need to prove
Lemma 4.5 in their paper.
5. Proofs
Proof of Remark 4. If Ω and U are universal knowledge–belief spaces (on the same space
of states of nature and for the same player set, of course), then there are knowledge–belief
morphisms f :U → Ω and g:Ω → U.It is easy to check, that the composite of two knowledge–
belief morphisms is also a knowledge–belief morphism and that the identity is always a
knowledge–belief morphism from a knowledge–belief space Ω to itself. By the uniqueness, it
follows that g ◦f = idU and therefore f is one-to-one and g is onto, and f ◦g = idΩ and there-
fore g is one-to-one and f is onto. f and g are knowledge–belief morphisms and f = g−1 and
g = f −1. 
Proof of Proposition 1. We show by induction on the formation of the expressions that m ∈ ϕM
iff f(m)∈ ϕN
• Let E ∈ ΣS. We have θN(f(m)) = θ(m),so f(m)∈ EN iff m ∈ EM.
• We have
f(m)∈ (¬ϕ)N iff f(m)/ ∈ ϕN iff m/ ∈ ϕM iff m ∈ (¬ϕ)M.M. Meier / Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2008) 53–66 63
• Let Ψ be a non-empty set of expressions with |Ψ|  ℵ0. Then
f(m)∈
 
ϕ∈Ψ
ϕ
N
iff for all ϕ ∈ Ψ: f(m)∈ ϕN,
which is by induction hypothesis the case iff for all ϕ ∈ Ψ: m ∈ ϕM, which is the case iff
m ∈ (


ϕ∈Ψ ϕ)M.
• We have
f(m)∈

ki(ϕ)
N iff f(m)∈ KN
i

ϕN
iff m ∈ f −1
KN
i

ϕN
iff
m ∈ Ki

f −1
ϕN
.
By the induction hypothesis, we have f −1(ϕN) = ϕM. Hence it follows that
f(m)∈

ki(ϕ)
N iff m ∈

ki(ϕ)
M.
• We have
f(m)∈

b
p
i (ϕ)
N iff T N
i

f(m)

ϕN
 p iff Ti(m)

f −1
ϕN
 p.
By the induction hypothesis: f −1(ϕN) = ϕM. Hence Ti(m)(f −1(ϕN)) = Ti(m)(ϕM). We
have Ti(m)(ϕM)  p iff m ∈ (b
p
i (ϕ))M. It follows that
f(m)∈

b
p
i (ϕ)
N iff m ∈

b
p
i (ϕ)
M. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Clear by the deﬁnition of [ϕ]. 
Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 1 we have
Ki

D−1
[ϕ]

= Ki

ϕM
=

ki(ϕ)
M = D−1
ki(ϕ)

= D−1
K∗
i

[ϕ]

. 
Proof of Proposition 3. For ω ∈ Ω choose a knowledge–belief space M on S for player set I
and m ∈ M such that D(m)= ω. For [ϕ]∈ΣΩ deﬁne
T ∗
i (ω)

[ϕ]

:= Ti(m)

D−1
[ϕ]

.
We have
Ti(m)

D−1
[ϕ]

= Ti(m)

ϕM
= sup

p | b
p
i (ϕ) ∈ D(m)
	
,
so T ∗
i (ω)([ϕ]) depends just on D(m) and is well deﬁned. By Remark 1, we have
Ti(m)

D−1(·)

∈ Δ(Ω,ΣΩ). 
Proof of Lemma 2. Let
d0(m) :=

E ∈ ΣS | m ∈ θ−1(E)
	
.
Obviously, d0(m) = D(m) ∩ ΣS. By the properties of (S,ΣS), we have for all s ∈ S :{ s}= 
s∈E∈ΣS E. It follows for every knowledge–belief space M  on S for player set I and m  ∈ M 
that
θ(m ) = s iff d0(m ) ={ E | s ∈ E}.64 M. Meier / Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2008) 53–66
For ω ∈ Ω choose a knowledge–belief space M on S for player set I and m ∈ M, such that
D(m)= ω.Deﬁnenowθ∗(ω) := θ(m).Sinceθ(m)justdependson D(m),θ∗(ω) iswelldeﬁned.
It remains to show that θ∗ is measurable: Let E ∈ ΣS. We have
θ∗
D(m)

∈ E iff m ∈ θ−1(E) iff E ∈ D(m) iff D(m)∈[ E].
It follows that θ∗−1(E) =[ E]. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Let (χn)n∈N,ϕ,ψ∈ Φ and M be a knowledge–belief space and m ∈ M.
(1) Let D(m) ∈ K∗
i ([ϕ]). Then, we have m ∈ Ki(ϕM) and therefore m ∈ ϕM. It follows that
D(m)∈[ ϕ].
(2) Let [ϕ]⊆[ ψ] and D(m)∈ K∗
i ([ϕ]). We have ϕM = D−1([ϕ]) ⊆ D−1([ψ]) = ψM and m ∈
Ki(ϕM). It follows that m ∈ Ki(ψM) and therefore D(m)∈ K∗
i ([ψ]).
(3) Let D(m)∈ Ω \ K∗
i ([ϕ]). We have m ∈ M \ Ki(ϕM) and therefore m ∈ Ki(M \ Ki(ϕM)).
By the deﬁnitions, we have D(m)∈[ ki(¬ki(ϕ))]. It follows that D(m)∈ K∗
i (Ω \K∗
i ([ϕ])).
(4) Let D(m) ∈

n∈NK∗
i ([χn]). It follows that m ∈

n∈NKi(χ
M
n ) and therefore m ∈
Ki(

n∈Nχ
M
n ). By the deﬁnitions, we have D(m)∈[ ki(


n∈Nχn)]. It follows that D(m)∈
K∗
i (

n∈N[χn]). 
Proof of Proposition 4. It remains to show
(1) Ω is non-empty.
(2) For every i ∈ I: T ∗
i is measurable as a function from Ω to Δ(Ω,ΣΩ).
(3) For every i ∈ I, ω ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ Φ: ω ∈ K∗
i ([ϕ]) implies T ∗
i (ω)([ϕ]) = 1.
(4) For every i ∈ I, ω ∈ Ω and ϕ ∈ Φ

ω  ∈ Ω | T ∗
i (ω ) = T ∗
i (ω)
	
⊆[ ϕ],
implies ω ∈ K∗
i ([ϕ]).
To:
(1) Let M := {m} and choose s ∈ S. Set Σ := Pow(M), Ki(E) := E, for E ⊆ M and i ∈ I,
T(m):= δm, for i ∈ I,and θ(m):= s. Then

M,Σ,(Ki)i∈I,(Ti)i∈I,θ

is a knowledge–belief space on S for player set I.
(2) Since inverse images commute with unions, intersections and complements, it is enough to
show that T ∗−1
i (βp(E)) ∈ ΣΩ, for
βp(E) :=

μ ∈ Δ(Ω,ΣΩ) | μ(E) p
	
,
where E ∈ ΣΩ and p ∈[ 0,1]. We have
T ∗−1
i

μ ∈ Δ(Ω,ΣΩ) | μ(E) p
	
=

ω ∈ Ω | T ∗
i (ω)(E)  p
	
.
Since E ∈ ΣΩ, there is a kb-expression ϕ such that E =[ ϕ]. Note that if p ∈[ 0,1] and
p = sup{q | b
q
i (ϕ) ∈ ω}, then b
p
i (ϕ) ∈ ω. This implies that
ω ∈ T ∗−1
i

μ ∈ Δ(Ω,ΣΩ) | μ(E) p
	
iff b
p
i (ϕ) ∈ ω.M. Meier / Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2008) 53–66 65
It follows that T ∗−1
i ({μ ∈ Δ(Ω,ΣΩ) | μ(E) p}) =[ b
p
i (ϕ)].
(3) Chose a knowledge–belief space M on S for player set I and m ∈ M such that D(m)= ω.
Since ω ∈ K∗
i ([ϕ]), we have by Proposition 2 and Lemma 1 m ∈ Ki(ϕM) and therefore
1 = Ti(m)(ϕM) = Ti(m)(D−1([ϕ])) = T ∗
i (D(m))([ϕ]).
(4) Let ϕ be a kb-expression and

ω  ∈ Ω | T ∗
i (ω ) = T ∗
i (ω)
	
⊆[ ϕ].
Chose a knowledge–belief space M on S for player set I and m ∈ M such that D(m) =
ω. Let m  ∈ M. If T ∗
i (D(m ))  = T ∗
i (D(m)), then there is a kb-expression ψ such that
Ti(m )(ψM)  = Ti(m)(ψM). It follows that
D

m  ∈ M | Ti(m ) = Ti(m)
	
⊆

ω  ∈ Ω | T ∗
i (ω ) = T ∗
i (ω)
	
,
which implies

m  ∈ M | Ti(m ) = Ti(m)
	
⊆ D−1
[ϕ]

= ϕM.
So we have
m ∈ Ki

ϕM
=

ki(ϕ)
M.
And hence, ω ∈[ ki(ϕ)]=K∗
i ([ϕ]). 
Proof of Lemma 4. For ω ∈ Ω,we have
ω =

ϕ ∈ Φ | ω ∈[ ϕ]
	
.
We have to show that for every kb-expression ϕ and every ω ∈ Ω: ω ∈ ϕΩ iff ω ∈[ ϕ]. We
know this already if ϕ = E, where E ∈ ΣS. It is obvious that Ω \[ϕ]=[ ¬ ϕ], and that if Ψ is a
non-empty set of kb-expressions of cardinality  ℵ0, then

ϕ∈Ψ
[ϕ]=
 
ϕ∈Ψ
ϕ

.
By the deﬁnition, we have K∗
i ([ϕ]) =[ ki(ϕ)]. So it remains to show that [ϕ]=ϕΩ implies
[b
p
i (ϕ)]=B
p
i ([ϕ]). For ω ∈ Ω, choose a knowledge–belief space M on S for player set I and
m ∈ M such that D(m)= ω. We have
D(m)∈

b
p
i (ϕ)

iff b
p
i (ϕ) ∈ D(m) iff Ti(m)

ϕM
 p.
But we have
T ∗
i (ω)

[ϕ]

= Ti(m)

D−1
[ϕ]

= Ti(m)

ϕM
.
This implies that [b
p
i (ϕ)]=B
p
i ([ϕ]). 
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